Security

Security Model

Last updated 2026-04-13

Security Model

Threat Assumptions

  • Guest code may be malformed, hostile, or generated by unreliable systems.
  • The host process is trusted.
  • Host capability implementations are trusted but may fail.

Deployment Guarantees

Addon Mode

  • In-process execution
  • Low latency
  • Best-effort containment only
  • Not a hard boundary against memory-safety or logic bugs

Sidecar Mode

  • Separate process boundary
  • Better crash containment
  • Easier forceful termination
  • Recommended for untrusted or resource-heavy guest code

Hardened Sidecar

Use sidecar mode with host-managed OS controls for adversarial inputs.

Security-Sensitive Boundaries

  • Parser and validator
  • Host value conversion
  • Bytecode loading
  • Snapshot loading
  • Sidecar protocol decoding

The maintained hostile-input suites, fuzz entry points, and denial-of-service audit notes live in docs/HARDENING.md.

Security Issue Criteria

The following are security issues:

  • Guest access to forbidden ambient authority
  • Unsafe deserialization of compiled programs or snapshots
  • Host object or native handle leakage across the boundary
  • Limits or cancellation failures that invalidate documented guarantees