Security
Security Model
Last updated 2026-04-13
Security Model
Threat Assumptions
- Guest code may be malformed, hostile, or generated by unreliable systems.
- The host process is trusted.
- Host capability implementations are trusted but may fail.
Deployment Guarantees
Addon Mode
- In-process execution
- Low latency
- Best-effort containment only
- Not a hard boundary against memory-safety or logic bugs
Sidecar Mode
- Separate process boundary
- Better crash containment
- Easier forceful termination
- Recommended for untrusted or resource-heavy guest code
Hardened Sidecar
Use sidecar mode with host-managed OS controls for adversarial inputs.
Security-Sensitive Boundaries
- Parser and validator
- Host value conversion
- Bytecode loading
- Snapshot loading
- Sidecar protocol decoding
The maintained hostile-input suites, fuzz entry points, and denial-of-service
audit notes live in docs/HARDENING.md.
Security Issue Criteria
The following are security issues:
- Guest access to forbidden ambient authority
- Unsafe deserialization of compiled programs or snapshots
- Host object or native handle leakage across the boundary
- Limits or cancellation failures that invalidate documented guarantees